Nash Equilibria of Packet Forwarding Strategies in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks by Felegyhazi, Mark et al.
Nash Equilibria of Packet Forwarding Strategies
in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks
Ma´rk Fe´legyha´zi, Student Member, IEEE, Jean-Pierre Hubaux, Senior Member, IEEE, and
Levente Buttya´n
Abstract—In self-organizing ad hoc networks, all the networking functions rely on the contribution of the participants. As a basic
example, nodes have to forward packets for each other in order to enable multihop communication. In recent years, incentive
mechanisms have been proposed to give nodes incentive to cooperate, especially in packet forwarding. However, the need for these
mechanisms was not formally justified. In this paper, we address the problem of whether cooperation can exist without incentive
mechanisms. We propose a model based on game theory and graph theory to investigate equilibrium conditions of packet forwarding
strategies. We prove theorems about the equilibrium conditions for both cooperative and noncooperative strategies. We perform
simulations to estimate the probability that the conditions for a cooperative equilibrium hold in randomly generated network scenarios.
As the problem is involved, we deliberately restrict ourselves to a static configuration. We conclude that in static ad hoc networks—
where the relationships between the nodes are likely to be stable—cooperation needs to be encouraged.
Index Terms—Ad hoc networks, cooperation, graph theory, game theory, Nash equilibrium.
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1 INTRODUCTION
IN multihop wireless ad hoc networks, networkingservices are provided by the nodes themselves. As a
fundamental example, the nodes must make a mutual
contribution to packet forwarding in order to ensure an
operable network. If the network is under the control of a
single authority, as is the case for military networks and
rescue operations, the nodes cooperate for the critical
purpose of the network. However, if each node is its own
authority, cooperation between the nodes cannot be taken
for granted; on the contrary, it is reasonable to assume that
each node has the goal to maximize its own benefits by
enjoying network services and at the same time minimizing
its contribution. This selfish behavior can significantly
damage network performance [4], [14].
In recent years, researchers have identified the problem
of stimulating cooperation in ad hoc networks and
proposed several solutions to give nodes incentive to
contribute to common network services. These solutions
are based on a reputation system [3], [15] or on a virtual
currency [5], [27]. All of these solutions are heuristics to
provide a reliable cooperation enforcement scheme. How-
ever, it has never been formally proven that these
techniques are really needed.
Recently, some researchers have claimed that under
specific conditions, cooperation may emerge without in-
centive techniques [21], [23]. However, they have assumed a
random connection setup, thus abstracting away the
topology of the network. This paper aims at determining
under which conditions such cooperation without incen-
tives can exist, while taking the network topology into
account. Indeed, in reality, the interactions between nodes
are not random, as they are determined by the network
topology and the communication pattern in the network.
We focus on the most basic networking mechanism,
namely, packet forwarding. We define a model in a game
theoretic framework and identify the conditions under
which an equilibrium based on cooperation exists. As the
problem is involved, we deliberately restrict ourselves to a
static configuration. This work expands our previous
publication on the topic [7] and is part of the MICS/
Terminodes Project [10].
The remainder of the paper is organized in the following
way: In Section 2, we provide an overview of related work.
In Section 3, we show how packet forwarding can be
modeled in a game theoretic framework. In Section 4, we
analyze the model introduced in Section 3. We provide our
main results stated as theorems in Section 5. We extend the
model in Section 6. Our simulation results are presented in
Section 7. In Section 8, we compare our solution to existing
approaches. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 9.
2 STATE OF THE ART
2.1 Incentive Mechanisms in Ad Hoc Networks
The operation of ad hoc networks relies on the contribution
of nodes. Several researchers have realized that this
cooperation is not obvious and have proposed solutions to
give nodes incentive to contribute. There are basically
two approaches to motivate nodes: 1) by denying service to
misbehaving nodes by means of a reputation mechanism or
2) by remunerating honest nodes, using for example a
micropayment scheme. We provide an overview of these
approaches below.
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Marti et al. [14] consider an ad hoc network where some
misbehaving nodes agree to forward packets but then fail to
do so. They propose a mechanism, called watchdog, in
charge of identifying the misbehaving nodes and another
mechanism, called pathrater, that deflects the traffic around
them. The drawback of their solution is that misbehaving
nodes are not punished and, thus, there is no incentive for
the nodes to cooperate. To overcome this problem,
Buchegger and Le Boudec [3] as well as Michiardi and
Molva [15] define protocols that are based on a reputation
system. In both approaches, the nodes observe the behavior
of each other and store this knowledge locally. Addition-
ally, they distribute this information in reputation reports.
According to their observations, the nodes are able to
behave selectively (e.g., nodes may deny forwarding
packets for misbehaving nodes). However, such a scheme
requires a reliable authentication scheme, Otherwise, it is
vulnerable to the Sybil attack [6]. Note that authentication is
an open issue in ad hoc networks and the Sybil attack is
proven to be always possible if a central authority is not
present in the network.
Other researchers proposed schemes that employ a
virtual currency system to motivate cooperation. Zhong
et al. [27] present a solution, where an offline central
authority collects receipts from the nodes that relay packets
and remunerates them based on these receipts. They rely on
public key cryptography to process each packet. Thus, their
solution might be too complex in an ad hoc network.
Another solution, presented by Buttyan and Hubaux [4],
[5], is based on a virtual currency, called a nuglet: If a node
wants to send its own packets, it has to pay for it; whereas,
if the node forwards a packet for the benefit of another
node, it is rewarded. However, some mechanisms of this
solution (e.g., the generation of nuglets) still need to be
investigated.
2.2 Cooperation without Incentive Mechanisms
The proposals that we have just described were based on
heuristics. There was a need for a formal description of the
cooperation problem in ad hoc networks.
In [21], Srinivasan et al. provide a mathematical frame-
work for cooperation in ad hoc networks, which focuses on
the energy-efficient aspects of cooperation. In their solution,
the nodes are classified in different energy classes and the
behavior of each node depends on the energy classes of the
participants of each connection. As this paper is the closest
to our work, we discuss it in detail in Section 8. Urpi et al.
[23] propose a general framework for cooperation without
any incentive mechanisms.
In our paper, we analyze the same problem: Is coopera-
tion possible based on the rational behavior of the nodes, or
are incentive mechanisms needed for cooperation? How-
ever, in contrast to previous approaches, we believe that the
network topology and the communication patterns in the
network have a significant impact on the existence of
spontaneous cooperation.
2.3 Application of Game Theory to Networking
Game theory has been used to solve various problems in ad
hoc, fixed, and cellular networks. Qiu and Marbach [18]
define a price-based approach for bandwidth allocation in
wireless ad hoc networks. Jin and Kesidis [11] propose a
generic mechanism for rate control and study Nash
equilibria in a networking game. Alpcan et al. [1] apply
game theory for uplink power control in cellular networks.
In [26], Xiao et al. describe a utility-based power control
framework for a cellular system. In [9], Goodman and
Mandayam introduce the concept of network-assisted
power control to equalize signal-to-interference ratio
between the users. Korilis et al. [12] address the problem
of allocating link capacities in routing decisions; in [13],
Korilis and Orda suggest a congestion-based pricing
scheme. Roughgarden [20] quantifies the worst-possible
loss in network performance arising from noncooperative
routing behavior. In [25], Yaı¨che et al. present a game
theoretic framework for bandwidth allocation; they study
the centralized problem and show that the solution can be
distributed in a way that leads to a system-wide optimum.
2.4 Cooperation Studies in Other Areas of Science
Most of the studies that consider cooperation of entities use
the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) game as their under-
lying model (see e.g., Axelrod [2], Rapaport and Chammah
[19], or Trivers [22]). The simplicity of the IPD makes it an
attractive model. The Continuous valued Prisoner’s Dilemma
(CPD) game was studied by Wahl and Nowak [24]. In the
CPD game, the nodes can choose a degree of cooperation
between full cooperation and full defection. In [2], Axelrod
identifies Tit-for-Tat (TFT) as a robust strategy that performs
surprisingly well (in terms of maximizing the player’s
payoff) in the Prisoner’s Dilemma games. TFT begins with
cooperation in the first round and then repeats the previous
move of the other player. We will see that cooperation
based on TFT exists also in the ad hoc networking context.
The classical Prisoner’s Dilemma game is not appropriate
for modeling packet forwarding because it involves only
two players that have symmetric roles. Hence, in this paper,
we define a multiplayer, asymmetric game that is inspired
by the classical Prisoner’s Dilemma game, which better
suits our purposes.
3 GAME THEORETIC MODEL OF PACKET
FORWARDING
3.1 Preliminaries
Let us consider an ad hoc network of n nodes. Let us denote
the set of all nodes by N . Each node has a given power
range and two nodes are said to be neighbors if they reside
within the power range of each other. We represent the
neighbor relationship between the nodes with an undir-
ected graph, which we call the connectivity graph. Each
vertex of the connectivity graph corresponds to a node in
the network, and two vertices are connected with an edge if
the corresponding nodes are neighbors.
Communication between two nonneighboring nodes is
based on multihop relaying. This means that packets from
the source to the destination are forwarded by intermediate
nodes. For a given source and destination, the intermediate
nodes are those that form the shortest path1 between the
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1. In other words, we abstract away the details of the routing protocol,
and we model it as a function that returns the shortest path between the
source and the destination. If there are multiple shortest paths, then one of
them is selected at random.
source and the destination in the connectivity graph. We
call such a chain of nodes (including the source and the
destination) a route. We call the topology of the network
with a given set of communicating nodes a scenario.
We use a discrete model of time where time is divided
into slots. We assume that both the connectivity graph and
the set of existing routes remain unchanged during a time
slot, whereas changes may happen at the end of each time
slot. We assume that the duration of the time slot is much
longer than the time needed to relay a packet from the
source to the destination. This means that a node is able to
send several packets within one time slot. This allows us to
abstract away individual packets and to represent the data
traffic in the network with flows. We assume CBR flows,
which means that a source node sends the same amount of
traffic in each time slot. Note, however, that this amount
may be different for every source node and every route.
3.2 Forwarding Game
Wemodel the operation of the network as a game, which we
call the forwarding game. The players of the forwarding game
are the nodes. In each time slot t, each node i chooses a
cooperation level piðtÞ 2 ½0; 1, where 0 and 1 represent full
defection and full cooperation, respectively. Here, defection
means that the node does not forward traffic for the benefit of
other nodes, whereas cooperation means that it does. Thus,
piðtÞ represents the fraction of the traffic routed through i in t
that i actually forwards. Note that i has a single cooperation
level piðtÞ, which it applies to every route in which it is
involved as a forwarder. We prefer to not require the nodes
to be able to distinguish the flows that belong to different
routes because this would require identifying the source-
destination pairs and applying a different cooperation level
to each of them; this would probably increase the computa-
tion at the nodes significantly.
Let us assume that in time slot t there exists a route r
with source node s and ‘ intermediate nodes f1; f2; . . . ; f‘.
Let us denote by TsðrÞ the constant amount of traffic that s
wants to send on r in each time slot. The throughput ðr; tÞ
experienced by the source s on r in t is defined as the
fraction of the traffic sent by s on r in t that is delivered to
the destination. Since we are studying cooperation in packet
forwarding, we assume that the main reason for packet
losses in the network is the noncooperative behavior of the
nodes. In other words, we assume that the network is not
congested and that the number of packets dropped because
of the limited capacity of the nodes and the links is
negligible. Hence, ðr; tÞ can be computed as the product of
TsðrÞ and the cooperation levels of all intermediate nodes:
ðr; tÞ ¼ TsðrÞ 
Y‘
k¼1
pfkðtÞ: ð1Þ
In addition, we define the normalized throughput ^ðr; tÞ as
follows:
^ðr; tÞ ¼ ðr; tÞ
TsðrÞ ¼
Y‘
k¼1
pfkðtÞ: ð2Þ
We will use the normalized throughput later as an input of
the strategy function of s.
The payoff sðr; tÞ of s on r in tdepends on the experienced
throughput ðr; tÞ. In general, sðr; tÞ ¼ usððr; tÞÞ, where the
utility us is some nondecreasing function. In this paper, we
further assume that us is concave, derivable at TsðrÞ, and
usð0Þ ¼ 0. We place no other restrictions on us. Note that the
utility function of different nodes may be different.
The payoff fjðr; tÞ of the jth intermediate node fj on r in
t is nonpositive and represents the cost for node fj to
forward packets on route r during time slot t. It is defined
as follows:
fjðr; tÞ ¼ TsðrÞ  c  ^jðr; tÞ; ð3Þ
where c is the cost of forwarding one unit of traffic, and
^jðr; tÞ is the normalized throughput on r in t leaving node j.
For simplicity, we assume that the nodes have the same,
fixed transmission power and, therefore, c is the same for
every node in the network, and it is independent from r and
t. ^jðr; tÞ is computed as the product of the cooperation levels
of the intermediate nodes from f1 up to and including fj:
^jðr; tÞ ¼
Yj
k¼1
pfkðtÞ: ð4Þ
In our model, the payoff of the destination is 0. In other
words, we assume that only the source benefits if the traffic
reaches the destination (information push). However, our
model can be applied in the reverse case: All our results also
hold when only the destination benefits from receiving
traffic. An example of this case is a file download
(information pull).
The total payoff iðtÞ of node i in time slot t is then
computed as
iðtÞ ¼
X
q2SiðtÞ
iðq; tÞ þ
X
r2FiðtÞ
iðr; tÞ; ð5Þ
where SiðtÞ is the set of routes in t where i is the source, and
FiðtÞ is the set of routes in twhere i is an intermediate node.
3.3 Strategy Space
In every time slot, each node i updates its cooperation level
using a strategy function i. In general, i could choose a
cooperation level to be used in time slot t, based on the
information it obtained in all preceding time slots. In order
to make the analysis feasible, we assume that i uses only
information that it obtained in the previous time slot. More
specifically, we assume that i chooses its cooperation level
piðtÞ in time slot t based on the normalized throughput it
experienced in time slot t 1 on the routes where it was a
source:
piðtÞ ¼ ið½^ðr; t 1Þr2Siðt1ÞÞ; ð6Þ
where ½^ðr; t 1Þr2Siðt1Þ represents the normalized through-
put vector for node i in time slot t 1, each element of which
is the normalized throughput experienced by i on a route
where it was source in t 1. The strategy of a node i is then
defined by its strategy function i and its initial cooperation
level pið0Þ.
Note that i takes as input the normalized throughput
and not the total payoff received by i in the previous time
slot. The rationale is that i should react to the behavior of
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the rest of the network, which is represented by the
normalized throughput in our model.
There is an infinite number of possible strategies; here, we
highlight only a fewof them for illustrative purposes. In these
examples,we assume that the input of the strategy function is
a scalar (i.e., a vector of length 1) denoted by in below.
. Always Defect (AllD): A node playing this strategy
defects in the first time slot, and then uses the
strategy function iðinÞ ¼ 0.
. Always Cooperate (AllC): A node playing this strategy
starts with cooperation, and then uses the strategy
function iðinÞ ¼ 1.
. Tit-For-Tat (TFT): A node playing this strategy starts
with cooperation, and then mimics the behavior of
its opponent in the previous time slot. The strategy
function that corresponds to the TFT strategy is
iðinÞ ¼ in.
. Suspicious Tit-For-Tat (S-TFT): A node playing this
strategy defects in the first time slot, and then
applies the strategy function iðinÞ ¼ in.
. Anti Tit-For-Tat (Anti-TFT): A node playing this
strategy does exactly the opposite of what its
opponent does. In other words, after cooperating in
the first time slot, it applies the strategy function
iðinÞ ¼ 1 in.
If the output of the strategy function is independent of its
input, then the strategy is called a nonreactive strategy (e.g.,
AllD or AllC). If the output depends on the input, then the
strategy is reactive (e.g., TFT or Anti-TFT).
Our model requires that each source be able to observe
the throughput in a given time slot on each of its routes. We
assume that this is made possible with high enough
precision by using some higher level control protocol above
the network layer.
4 METAMODEL
In this section, we introduce a metamodel in order to
formalize the properties of the packet forwarding game
defined in the previous section. In the metamodel, we focus
on the evolution of the cooperation levels of the nodes; all
other details of the model defined earlier (e.g., amounts of
traffic, forwarding costs, and utilities) are abstracted away.
Unlike in the model, in the metamodel and in the remainder
of the paper, we will assume that routes remain unchanged
during the lifetime of the network. In addition,we assume for
the moment that each node is the source of only one route.2
Let us consider a route r. The payoff received by the
source on r depends on the cooperation levels of the
intermediate nodes on r. We represent this dependency
relationship between the nodes with a directed graph,
which we call the dependency graph. Each vertex of the
dependency graph corresponds to a network node. There is
a directed edge from vertex i to vertex j, denoted by the
ordered pair ði; jÞ, if there exists a route where i is an
intermediate node and j is the source. Intuitively, an edge
ði; jÞ means that the behavior (cooperation level) of i has an
effect on j. The concept of dependency graph is illustrated
in Fig. 1.
Now, we define the automaton  that will model the
unfolding of the forwarding game in the metamodel. The
automaton is built on the dependency graph. We assign a
machine Mi to every vertex i of the dependency graph and
interpret the edges of the dependency graph as links that
connect the machines assigned to the vertices. Each
machine Mi, thus, has some input and some (possibly 0)
output links.
The internal structure of the machine is illustrated in
Fig. 2. Each machineMi consists of a multiplication
3 gate
Q
followed by a gate that implements the strategy function i
of node i. The multiplication gate
Q
takes the values on the
input links and passes their product to the strategy function
gate.4 Finally, the output of the strategy function gate is
passed to each output link of Mi.
The automaton works in discrete steps. As an example,
Fig. 3 shows the automaton that corresponds to the
dependency graph of Fig. 1. Initially, in Step 0, each
machine Mi outputs some initial value xið0Þ. Then, in Step
t > 0, each machine computes its output xiðtÞ by taking the
values that appear on its input links in step t 1.
Note that, if xið0Þ ¼ pið0Þ for all i, then in step t, each
machine Mi will output the cooperation level of node i in
time slot t (i.e., xiðtÞ ¼ piðtÞ), as we assumed that the set of
routes (and, hence, the dependency graph) remains un-
changed in every time slot. Therefore, the evolution of the
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Fig. 1. Representation of a network: (a) A graph showing five routes and
(b) the corresponding dependency graph.
Fig. 2. Internal structure of machine Mi.
2. We will relax this assumption in Section 6. We emphasize that all of
our analytical results hold in the extended case as well.
3. The multiplication comes from the fact that the experienced normal-
ized throughput for the source (which is the input of the strategy function of
the source) is the product of the cooperation levels of the forwarders on its
route.
4. Note that here i takes a single real number as input, instead of a
vector of real numbers as we defined earlier because we assume that each
node is source of only one route.
values (which, in fact, represent the state of the automaton)
on the output links of the machines models the evolution of
the cooperation levels of the nodes in the network.
In order to study the interaction of node i with the rest of
the network, we extract the gate that implements the
strategy function i from the automaton . What remains is
the automaton without i, which we denote by i. i has
an input and an output link; if we connect these to the
output and the input, respectively, of i (as illustrated in
Fig. 4), then we get back the original automaton . In other
words, the automaton in Fig. 4 is another representation of
the automaton in Fig. 3, which captures the fact that from
the viewpoint of node i, the rest of the network behaves like
an automaton: The input of i is the sequence xi ¼
xið0Þ; xið1Þ; . . . of the cooperation levels of i, and its output
is the sequence yi ¼ yið0Þ; yið1Þ; . . . of the normalized
throughput values for i.
By using the system of equations that describe the
operation of , one can easily express any element yiðtÞ of
sequence yi as some function of the preceding elements
xiðt 1Þ; xiðt 2Þ; . . . ; xið0Þ of sequence xi and the initial
values xjð0Þ (j 6¼ i) of the machines within i. We call such
an expression of yiðtÞ the tth input/output formula or the tth i/
o formula of i, for short. It is important to note that the i/o
formulae of i may involve any strategy function j where
j 6¼ i, but they never involve i. Considering again the
automaton in Fig. 3, and extracting, for instance, A, we can
determine the first few i/o formulae of A as follows:
yAð0Þ ¼ xCð0Þ  xEð0Þ
yAð1Þ ¼ CðxEð0ÞÞ  EðxAð0ÞÞ
yAð2Þ ¼ CðEðxAð0ÞÞÞ  EðxAð1ÞÞ
yAð3Þ ¼ CðEðxAð1ÞÞÞ  EðxAð2ÞÞ
. . . . . .
A dependency loop L of node i is a sequence
ði; v1Þ; ðv1; v2Þ; . . . ; ðv‘1; v‘Þ; ðv‘; iÞ of edges in the depen-
dency graph. The length of a dependency loop L is defined
as the number of edges in L, and it is denoted by jLj. The
existence of dependency loops is important: if node i has
no dependency loops, then the cooperation level chosen
by i in a given time slot has no effect on the normalized
throughput experienced by i in future time slots. In the
example, nodes B and D have no dependency loops.
Every node i has two types of dependency loops; these
types depend on the strategies played by the other nodes in
the loop. If L is a dependency loop of i and all other nodes
j 6¼ i in L play reactive strategies, then L is said to be a
reactive dependency loop of i. If, on the contrary, there exists at
least one node j 6¼ i in L that plays a nonreactive strategy,
then L is called a nonreactive dependency loop of i.
5 ANALYTICAL RESULTS
Our goal, in this section, is to find possible Nash equilibria5
[8], [16], [17] of packet forwarding strategies. In the next
section, we will investigate the probability of fulfillment of the
conditions for possible Nash equilibria in randomly
generated scenarios. The existence of a Nash equilibrium
based on cooperation would mean that there are cases in
which cooperation is “naturally” encouraged, i.e., without
using incentive mechanisms. In the following, we use the
model and the metamodel that we introduced earlier.
The goal of the nodes is to maximize the payoff that they
accumulate over time. However, the end of the game is
unpredictable. Thus, we apply the standard technique used
in the theory of iterative games [2]. We model the finite
forwarding game with an unpredictable end as an infinite
game where future payoffs are discounted. The cumulative
payoff i of a node i is computed as the weighted sum of
the payoffs iðtÞ that i obtains in each time slot t:
i ¼
X1
t¼0
½iðtÞ  !t; ð7Þ
where 0 < ! < 1 and, hence, the weights exponentially
decrease with t. The discounting factor ! represents the
degree to which the payoff of each time slot is discounted
relative to the previous time slot.
Recall that SiðtÞ denotes the set of routes for which i is
the source and that FiðtÞ denotes the set of routes for which
i is an intermediate node. As we assume that the routes
remain static, meaning that SiðtÞ and FiðtÞ do not change
over time, we will simply write Si and Fi instead of SiðtÞ
and FiðtÞ. In addition, since we assume that each node is a
source on exactly one route, Si is a singleton. We denote the
single route in Si by ri, and the amount of traffic sent by i on
ri in every time slot by Ti. The cardinality of Fi will be
denoted by jFij. For any route r 2 Fi, we denote the set of
intermediate nodes on r upstream from node i (including
node i) by ðr; iÞ. Moreover, ðrÞ denotes the set of all
forwarder nodes on route r, and srcðrÞ denotes the source of
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Fig. 3. Theautomaton that corresponds to the dependency graphof Fig. 1.
Fig. 4. Model of interaction between node i and the rest of the network
represented by the automaton i.
5. Recall that in a Nash equilibrium, none of the players can increase its
utility by unilaterally changing its strategy.
route r. Finally, the set of nodes that are forwarders on at
least one route is denoted by  (i.e.,  ¼ fi 2 N : Fi 6¼ ;g).
Theorem 1. If a node i is in  and it has no dependency loops,
then its best strategy is AllD (i.e., to choose cooperation level 0
in every time slot).
Proof. Node i wants to maximize its cumulative payoff i
defined in (7). In our case, iðtÞ can be written as:
iðtÞ ¼ iðri; tÞ þ
X
r2Fi
iðr; tÞ
¼ uiðTi  yiðtÞÞ 
X
r2Fi
TsrcðrÞ  c 
Y
k2ðr;iÞ
xkðtÞ:
Given that i has no dependency loops, yiðtÞ is indepen-
dent of all the previous cooperation levels xiðt0Þ ðt0 < tÞ
of node i. Thus, i is maximized if xiðt0Þ ¼ 0 for all
t0  0. tu
Theorem 2. If a node i is in  and it has only nonreactive
dependency loops, then its best strategy is AllD.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 1. Since all
dependency loops of i are nonreactive, its experienced
normalized throughput yi is independent of its own
behavior xi. This implies that its best strategy is full
defection. tu
From this theorem, we can easily derive the following
corollary.
Corollary 1. If every node j (j 6¼ i) plays AllD, then the best
response of i to this is AllD. Hence, every node playing AllD is
a Nash equilibrium.
If the conditions of Theorems 1 and 2 do not hold, then
we cannot determine the best strategy of a node i in general
because it very much depends on the particular scenario
(dependency graph) in question and the strategies played
by the other nodes.
Now, we will show that, under certain conditions,
cooperative equilibria do exist in the network. In order to
do so, we first prove the following lemma:
Lemma 1. Let us assume that node i is in , and let us consider a
route r 2 Fi. In addition, let us assume that there exists a
dependency loop L of i that contains the edge ði; srcðrÞÞ. If all
nodes in L (other than i) play the TFT strategy, then the
following holds:
yiðtþ Þ 
Y
k2ðr;iÞ
xkðtÞ; ð8Þ
where  ¼ jLj  1.
Proof. Let L be the following sequence of edges in the
dependency graph: ðv0; v1Þ; ðv1; v2Þ; . . . ; ðv; vþ1Þ; , where
vþ1 ¼ v0 ¼ i and v1 ¼ srcðrÞ. We know that each node is
the source of a single route; let us denote by rvj ð0 < j 
 þ 1Þ the route, on which vj is the source. It follows that
rv1 ¼ r. In addition, we know that the existence of edge
ðvj; vjþ1Þ ð0  j  Þ in the dependency graph means that
vj is a forwarder on rvjþ1 . The following holds for every
node vj ð0  j  Þ:
xvjðtÞ 
Y
k2ðrvjþ1 ;vjÞ
xkðtÞ 
Y
k2ðrvjþ1 Þ
xkðtÞ ¼ yvjþ1ðtÞ: ð9Þ
Furthermore, since every node except for v0 ¼ vþ1 ¼ i
plays TFT, we have the following for every 0 < j  :
xvjðtþ 1Þ ¼ yvjðtÞ: ð10Þ
Using (9) and (10) in an alternating order, we get the
following:
xv0ðtÞ 
Y
k2ðrv1 ;v0Þ
xkðtÞ  yv1ðtÞ
¼ xv1ðtþ 1Þ  yv2ðtþ 1Þ
¼ xv2ðtþ 2Þ  . . .  yvþ1ðtþ Þ:
ð11Þ
By substituting i for v0 and vþ1, and r for rv1 , we get the
statement of the lemma:
xiðtÞ 
Y
k2ðr;iÞ
xkðtÞ  . . .  yiðtþ Þ: ð12Þ
tu
As an example, let us consider Fig. 5, which illustrates a
dependency loop of length 5 (i.e.,  ¼ 4). According to
Lemma 1, if nodes v1, v2, v3, and v4 play TFT, then the
normalized throughput enjoyed by node i in time slot tþ 4
is upper bounded by its own cooperation level in time slot t.
Intuitively, this means that if node i does not cooperate,
then this defection “propagates back” to it on the
dependency loop. The delay of this effect is given by the
length of the dependency loop.
Theorem 3. Assuming that node i is in , the best strategy for i
is full cooperation in each time slot, if the following set of
conditions holds:
1. For every r 2 Fi, there exists a dependency loop
Li;srcðrÞ that contains the edge ði; srcðrÞÞ.
2. For every r 2 Fi,
u0iðTiÞ  Ti  !i;srcðrÞ
jFij > TsrcðrÞ  c; ð13Þ
where u0iðTiÞ is the value of the derivative6 of uiðÞ at
 ¼ Ti, and i;srcðrÞ ¼ jLi;srcðrÞj  1.
3. Every node in  (other than i) plays the TFT strategy.
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6. Recall the assumption that ui is derivable at Ti.
Fig. 5. Example to illustrate the propagation of behavior as expressed
formally in Lemma 1.
The proof of Theorem 3 is provided in the Appendix.
We have derived necessary conditions for spontaneous
cooperation from Theorems 1 and 2. The fulfillment of the
three conditions of Theorem 3 is sufficient for cooperation to
be the best strategy for node i. We now discuss these three
conditions one by one. Condition 1 requires that node i has a
dependency loop with all of the sources for which it
forwards packets. Condition 2 means that the maximum
forwarding cost for node i on every route where i is a
forwarder must be smaller than its possible future benefit
averaged over the number of routes where i is a forwarder.
Finally, Condition 3 requires that all forwarding nodes in the
network (other than node i) play TFT. This implies that all
the dependency loops of node i are reactive. We note that
the reactivity of the dependency loops can be based on
other reactive strategies, different from TFT (for example,
Anti-TFT), but in that case the analysis becomes very
complex. The analysis of the case when every node plays
TFT is made possible by the simplicity of the strategy
function ðxÞ ¼ x, which belongs to the TFT strategy. If all
three conditions of Theorem 3 are satisfied, then node i has
an incentive to cooperate, since otherwise its defective
behavior will negatively affect its own payoff. However, as
we will show in Section 7, Condition 1 is a very strong
requirement that is virtually never satisfied in randomly
generated scenarios.
Both the AllC and TFT strategies result in full coopera-
tion if the conditions of Theorem 3 hold. However, node i
should not choose AllC because AllC is a nonreactive
strategy, and this might cause other nodes to change their
strategies to AllD, as we will show in Section 7. Hence, we
can derive the following corollary for cooperative Nash
equilibria.
Corollary 2. If the first two conditions of Theorem 3 hold for
every node in , then all nodes playing TFT is a Nash
equilibrium.
In Section 7, we study Condition 1 of Theorem 3, more
specifically, the probability that it is satisfied for all nodes in
randomly generated scenarios. Now, we briefly comment
on Condition 2. As it can be seen, the following factors make
Condition 2 easier to satisfy:
. Steep utility functions. The steeper the utility function
of node i is, the larger the value of its derivative is at
 ¼ Ti, which, in turn, makes the left side of (13)
larger.
. Short dependency loops. In Condition 2, i;srcðrÞ þ 1 is the
length of any dependency loop of node i that
contains the edge ði; srcðrÞÞ. Clearly, we are inter-
ested in the shortest of such loops, because the
smaller i;srcðrÞ is, the larger the value of !i;srcðrÞ is,
which, in turn, makes the left side of (13) larger. It is
similarly advantageous if ! is close to 1, which
means, in general, that the probability that the game
will continue is higher and thus possible future
payoffs count more.
. Small extent of involvement in forwarding. The left side
of (13) is increased if the cardinality of Fi is
decreased. In other words, if node i is a forwarder
on a smaller number of routes, then Condition 2 is
easier to satisfy for i.
The first two theorems state that if the behavior of node i
has no effect on its experienced normalized throughput,
then defection is the best choice for i. In addition,
Corollary 1 says that if every node always defects, then
this is a Nash equilibrium. Theorem 3 leads to Corollary 2,
which shows the existence of a cooperative equilibrium
(each node playing TFT) under certain conditions.
Fig. 6 shows a classification of scenarios from the
cooperation perspective. In the figure, set D denotes the
set of all possible scenarios; indeed, we know from
Corollary 1 that all nodes playing AllD is a Nash
equilibrium in any possible scenario. Set C2 contains those
scenarios where the conditions of Corollary 2 hold. Hence,
all nodes playing TFT is a Nash equilibrium in every
scenario in C2. Finally, set C contains those scenarios,
where the condition of Theorem 1 does not hold for any of
the nodes in , or in other words, where every node in 
has at least one dependency loop. Determining the Nash
equilibria in the scenarios that belong to set C n C2 is still an
open research problem. In Section 7, we will describe our
simulation results that quantify the size of the above sets.
6 EXTENSION OF THE MODEL: ALLOWING NODES
TO BE A SOURCE OF SEVERAL ROUTES
In this section, we show that the assumption that each node
is a source on only one route can be relaxed. For this, we
slightly modify our initial model illustrated in Fig. 2, and we
define another machine representation for the node. This
new representation is illustrated in Fig. 7. The main novelty
is that the outputs of themultiplication gates that correspond
FELEGYHAZI ET AL.: NASH EQUILIBRIA OF PACKET FORWARDING STRATEGIES IN WIRELESS AD HOC NETWORKS 7
Fig. 6. Classification of scenarios defined by our analytical results.
to the various routes for which the node is the source are
transformed into a single value using a function V .
Theorems 1 and 2 still hold for an arbitrary V because
the existence of dependency loops does not depend on
the internal structure of the machine representing the
nodes. Moreover, assuming that V has the property that
V ðy1; y2; . . . yjSijÞ  yk for all 1  k  jSij, we can prove a
theorem similar to Theorem 3, where Condition 1 and
Condition 3 are unchanged, and Condition 2 has a slightly
different form:
Theorem 4. Assuming that node i is in , the best strategy for i
is full cooperation in each time slot, if the following set of
conditions holds:
1. For every r 2 Fi, there exists a dependency loop
Li;srcðrÞ that contains the edge ði; srcðrÞÞ.
2. For every r 2 Fi,
!i;srcðrÞ
jFij 
X
q2Si
u0iðTiðqÞÞ  TiðqÞ > TsrcðrÞ  c;
where TiðqÞ denotes the amount of traffic that node i
sends as a source on route q, while u0i and i;srcðrÞ have
the same meaning as in Theorem 3.
3. Every node in  (other than i) plays the TFT strategy.
The proof of Theorem 4 is analogous to that of Theorem 3
and, therefore, we omit it.
An example for such a function V is the minimum
function (which we will use in our simulations). This choice
of V represents a pessimistic perception for the node: It
considers the minimum normalized throughput it receives
on the different routes as an aggregate view of all its routes.
Similarly to Corollary 2, if the (modified) conditions of
Theorem 3 hold for every node that is a forwarder on at
least one route, then all nodes playing TFT is a Nash
equilibrium.
7 SIMULATION RESULTS
We have run a set of simulations to determine the
probability that the conditions of our theorems and their
corollaries hold. In particular, our goal is to estimate the
probability that the first condition of Theorem 3 holds for
every node in randomly generated scenarios.7 In addition,
we also estimate the probability that the condition of
Theorem 1 does not hold for any of the nodes in randomly
generated scenarios. These probabilities quantify the size of
sets C2 and C, respectively.
In our simulations, we randomly place nodes on a
toroid8 area. Then, for each node, we randomly choose a
number of destinations and we determine a route to these
destinations using a shortest path algorithm. If several
shortest paths existed to a given destination, then we
randomly choose a single one. From the routes, we build up
the dependency graph of the network. The simulation
parameters are summarized in Table 1.
Note that we increase the network size and the
simulation area in parallel in order to keep the node density
at a constant level. All the presented results are the mean
values of 1,000 simulation runs.
In the first set of simulations, we investigate the
probability that the first condition of Theorem 3 holds for
every node (the size of the set C2 in Fig. 6). Among the
1,000 scenarios that we generated randomly, we observed
that there was not a single scenario in which the first
condition of Theorem 3 was satisfied for all nodes. Thus, we
conclude that the probability of a Nash equilibrium based
on TFT as defined in Corollary 2 is very small.
In the second set of simulations, we investigate the
proportion of random scenarios, where cooperation of all
nodes is not excluded by Theorem 1. Fig. 8 shows the
proportion of scenarios, where each node in  has at least
one dependency loop (the scenarios in set C in Fig. 6) as a
function of the number of routes originating at each node.
We can observe that for an increasing number of routes
originating at each node, the proportion of scenarios, where
each node has at least one dependency loop, increases as
well. Intuitively, as more routes are introduced in the
network, more edges are added to the dependency graph.
Hence, the probability that a dependency loop exists for
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Fig. 7. Modified machine for a node (M 0i). 
0
i represents the modified
strategy function for node i.
7. The second condition of Theorem 3 is a numerical one. Whether it is
fulfilled or not very much depends on the actual utility functions and
parameter values (e.g., amount of traffic and discounting factor) used.
Since, by appropriately setting these parameters, the second condition of
Theorem 3 can always be satisfied, in our analysis, we make the optimistic
assumption that this condition holds for every node in .
8. We use this area type to avoid border effects. In a realistic scenario, the
toroid area can be considered as an inner part of a large network.
TABLE 1
Parameter Values for the Simulation
each node increases. Furthermore, we can observe that the
proportion of scenarios in which each node has at least one
dependency loop decreases, as the network size increases.
This is due to the following reason: the probability that there
exists at least one node for which the condition of Theorem 1
holds increases as the number of nodes increases.
Fig. 8 shows that the proportion of scenarios, where
cooperation of all nodes is not excluded by Theorem 1 (setC)
becomes significant (with respect to set D) only for cases in
which each node is a source of a large number of routes. This
implies that the necessary condition expressed by Theorem 1
is a strong requirement for cooperation in realistic settings
(i.e., for a reasonably low number of routes per node).
Now, let us consider the case, in which the nodes for
which Theorem 1 holds begin to play AllD. This non-
cooperative behavior can lead to an “avalanche effect” if the
nodes iteratively optimize their strategies: nodes that defect
can cause the defection of other nodes. We examine this
avalanche effect in a simulation setting as follows.
Let us assume that each node is a source on one route.
First, we identify the nodes in the set of forwarders  that
have AllD as the best strategy due to Theorem 1. We denote
the set of these defectors by Z0. Then, we search for sources
that are dependent on the nodes in Z0. We denote the set of
these sources by Zþ0 . Since the normalized throughput of
the nodes in Zþ0 is less than or equal to the cooperation level
of any of their forwarders (including the nodes in Z0), their
best strategy becomes AllD, as well, due to Theorem 2.
Therefore, we extend the set Z0 of defectors and obtain
Z1 ¼ Z0 [ Zþ0 . We extend the set Zk of defectors iteratively
in this way until no new sources are affected (i.e.,
Zk [ Zþk ¼ Zk). The remaining set  n Zk of nodes is not
affected by the behavior of the nodes in Zk (and, hence, the
nodes in Z0); this means that they are potential cooperators.
Similarly, we can investigate the avalanche effect when the
nodes are sources of several routes. In that case, we take the
pessimistic assumption that the defection of a forwarder
causes the defection of its sources. Then, we can iterate the
search for the nodes that are affected by defection in the
same way as above.
In Fig. 9, we present the proportion of scenarios, where
there exists a subset of nodes that are not affected by the
defective behavior of the initial AllD players.We can see that
this proportion converges rapidly to 1 as the number of
routes originating at each node increases. The intuitive
explanation is that increasing the number of routes per
source (i.e., adding edges to the dependency graph)
decreases the probability that Theorem 1 holds for a given
node. Thus, as the number of routes per sources increases the
number of forwarders that begin to play AllD decreases and
so does the number of nodes affected by the avalanche effect.
Additionally, we present in Fig. 10 the proportion of
forwarder nodes that are not affected by the avalanche
effect. The results show that, if we increase the number of
routes originating at each node, the average number of
unaffected nodes increases rapidly. For a higher number of
routes per node, this increase slows down, but we can
observe that the majority of the nodes are not affected by
the defective behavior of the initial AllD players.
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Fig. 8. Proportion of scenarios, where each node that is a forwarder has
at least one dependency loop.
Fig. 9. Proportion of scenarios, where at least one node is not affected
by the defective behavior of the initial nodes.
Fig. 10. Average proportion of forwarder nodes that are not affected by
the avalanche effect.
8 DISCUSSION
In this section, we give a detailed discussion of the paper
written by Srinivasan et al. [21] as this is the work that is the
closest to our framework.
In [21], the authors propose a game theoretic model that
considers cooperation from the energy efficiency point of
view. They consider amaximal battery level and an expected
lifetime for each node, and they group the nodes into energy
classes according to this information. They derive the energy
class for a connection as theminimumof the energy classes of
the participants. The energy class is a novel idea that allows
the authors to express the heterogeneity of devices. They
define time slots as aunit of operation for the nodes aswe also
do in our framework. However, in contrast to our approach,
they do not take into account the topology of the network and
the existing communication flows. Instead, they assume that
a single communication session with random participants is
generated in each time slot. Based on the random session
generation, they show that cooperation emerges within the
network because, by the nature of the random participation
in the sessions, nodes have a symmetric interaction pattern.
However, in reality, the interactions between nodes are likely
to be asymmetric; this is practically true in the extreme case of
a static network. In this paper, we have shown that
spontaneous cooperation exists only if the interaction
between the nodes is balanced and we have also shown that
this property does not hold in general. Our conclusion
justifies the need for incentive mechanisms, that should
reestablish the balance between the utilities of nodes, for
example by remunerating nodes that contribute more.
The authors of [21] provide a framework that relies on
two mechanisms: The first communicates energy class
information while the second enables the relays of a session
to communicate their decision to the source (accept or
refuse relaying). These mechanisms are needed to optimize
the nodes’ contribution with respect to energy conditions.
From the security point of view, however, these mechan-
isms are vulnerable. This is an important issue since the
whole analysis is about selfish nodes that want to maximize
their utility, even if it means disobeying the network
protocols. Cheating can be done as follows: First, a high-
energy node could use its own identity when sending its
own packets and pretend to be a low energy node when
asked to forward packets. By doing this, it could decrease
its load in terms of packet forwarding. This kind of selfish
behavior could be detected using an appropriate authenti-
cation scheme, combined with a cheating detection mechan-
ism. Second, in [21], it is assumed that once nodes agree to
relay packets in a session, they do so. But, there is no
guarantee that a node really complies to its promise. Thus,
an additional mechanism should be applied to punish
nodes whenever it is necessary. Although far from perfect,
our model relies on the real behavior of the nodes (and not
on their declared behavior) and does not require any form
of authentication.
A major contribution of [21] is the investigation of both
the existence and emergence of cooperation in wireless ad
hoc networks; in this paper, we focus only on the existence
of cooperative equilibria. Another important result of [21] is
the proof that the emerging cooperative Nash equilibrium is
Pareto-efficient (thus, it is a desired outcome of the packet
forwarding game).
9 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented a game theoretic model to
investigate the conditions for cooperation in wireless ad hoc
networks, in the absence of incentive mechanisms. Because
of the complexity of the problem, we have restricted
ourselves to a static network scenario. We have then
derived conditions for cooperation from the topology of
the network and the existing communication routes. We
have introduced the concept of dependency graph, based
on which we have been able to prove several theorems. As
one of the results, we have proven that cooperation solely
based on the self-interest of the nodes can in theory exist.
However, our simulation results show that, in practice, the
conditions of such cooperation are virtually never satisfied.
We conclude that with a very high probability, there will be
some nodes that have AllD as their best strategy and,
therefore, these nodes need an incentive to cooperate. In
this paper, we have also shown that the behavior of these
defectors affects only a fraction of the nodes in the network;
hence, local subsets of cooperating nodes are not excluded.
To the best of our knowledge, this work on cooperation
in ad hoc networks is the first that takes the topology of the
network into account. It is important to notice that our
approach does not require a node to keep track of the
behavior of other nodes. Thus, our solution does not require
any node authentication.
In terms of future work, we intend to investigate
cooperation in mobile ad hoc networks. Mobility increases
mutual dependencies between the nodes; thus, it gives a
natural incentive for cooperation. We also want to extend
our model by including the effect of battery in the utility of
the nodes. In this paper, we have studied the conditions for
possible equilibria; a distributed solution that drives the
system to the most desirable equilibrium state is also part of
our future work.
APPENDIX A
PROOF oF THEOREM 3
In this proof, we will express the maximum possible value
of the total payoff for node i in general. Then we will show
that the maximum corresponds to the case in which node i
fully cooperates. First, we introduce the linear function
fðÞ ¼ u0iðTiÞ   þ uiðTiÞ  u0iðTiÞ  Ti. Function f is the tan-
gent of function ui at  ¼ Ti. Note that due to the fact that ui
is nondecreasing and concave, we have that fðÞ  uiðÞ for
all  ; in addition, we have equality at  ¼ Ti (i.e.,
fðTiÞ ¼ uiðTiÞ).
By definition, the total payoff i of node i is the
following:
i ¼
X1
t¼0
iðri; tÞ þ
X
r2Fi
iðr; tÞ
" #
!t
¼
X1
t¼0
uiðTi  yiðtÞÞ 
X
r2Fi
TsrcðrÞ  c 
Y
k2ðr;iÞ
xkðtÞ
2
4
3
5!t:
ð14Þ
Because of Condition 1 and Condition 3, we can use
Lemma 1 to obtain the following inequality for every r 2 Fi:
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Y
k2ðr;iÞ
xkðtÞ  yiðtþ i;srcðrÞÞ ð15Þ
which leads to the following upper bound on i:
i 
X1
t¼0
uiðTi  yiðtÞÞ 
X
r2Fi
TsrcðrÞ  c  yiðtþ i;srcðrÞÞ
" #
!t: ð16Þ
Since the first term of the right side of (16), uiðTi  yiðtÞÞ, is
independent of r, the following holds:
uiðTi  yiðtÞÞ ¼
X
r2Fi
uiðTi  yiðtÞÞ
jFij : ð17Þ
By substituting the right side of (17) into (16), we get the
following:
i 
X1
t¼0
X
r2Fi
uiðTi  yiðtÞÞ
jFij 
X
r2Fi
TsrcðrÞ  c  yiðtþ i;srcðrÞÞ
" #
!t
¼
X
r2Fi
X1
t¼0
uiðTi  yiðtÞÞ
jFij  !
t

X1
t¼0
TsrcðrÞ  c  yiðtþ i;srcðrÞÞ  !t

:
ð18Þ
Let us consider the first term of (18).Wewill now split up the
summation that goes from t ¼ 0 to 1 into two summations
such that one goes from t ¼ 0 to i;srcðrÞ  1, and the other
goes from t ¼ i;srcðrÞ to 1. Then, we shift the index in the
second sum in such a way that the summation goes from
t ¼ 0 to 1 again:
X1
t¼0
uiðTi  yiðtÞÞ
jFij  !
t
¼
Xi;srcðrÞ1
t¼0
uiðTi  yiðtÞÞ
jFij  !
t þ
X1
t¼i;srcðrÞ
uiðTi  yiðtÞÞ
jFij  !
t
¼
Xi;srcðrÞ1
t¼0
uiðTi  yiðtÞÞ
jFij  !
t þ
X1
t¼0
uiðTi  yiðtþ i;srcðrÞÞÞ
jFij  !
tþi;srcðrÞ :
ð19Þ
By writing (19) back into (18), we get the following:
i 
X
r2Fi
 Xi;srcðrÞ1
t¼0
uiðTi  yiðtÞÞ
jFij  !
t
þ
X1
t¼0

uiðTi  yiðtþ i;srcðrÞÞÞ
jFij  !
i;srcðrÞ
 TsrcðrÞ  c  yiðtþ i;srcðrÞÞ

 !t

:
ð20Þ
Let us consider the first term of (20). Since the utility
function ui is nondecreasing and yiðtÞ  1, we get the
following:
Xi;srcðrÞ1
t¼0
uiðTi  yiðtÞÞ
jFij  !
t 
Pi;srcðrÞ1
t¼0 uiðTiÞ
jFij  !t
¼ uiðTiÞjFij 
1 !i;srcðrÞ
1 ! :
ð21Þ
Now, let us consider the second term of (20). By using the
fact that fðÞ  uiðÞ for all  , we get the following:
X1
t¼0

uiðTi  yiðtþ i;srcðrÞÞÞ
jFij  !
i;srcðrÞ  TsrcðrÞ  c
 yiðtþ i;srcðrÞÞ

 !t

X1
t¼0

fðTi  yiðtþ i;srcðrÞÞÞ
jFij  !
i;srcðrÞ  TsrcðrÞ  c
 yiðtþ i;srcðrÞÞ

 !t
¼
X1
t¼0

u0iðTiÞ  Ti  yiðtþ i;srcðrÞÞ þ uiðTiÞ  u0iðTiÞ  Ti
jFij
 !i;srcðrÞ  TsrcðrÞ  c  yiðtþ i;srcðrÞÞ

 !t
¼
X1
t¼0

uiðTiÞ  u0iðTiÞ  Ti
jFij  !
i;srcðrÞ
þ u
0
iðTiÞ  Ti  !i;srcðrÞ
jFij  TsrcðrÞ  c
 
 yiðtþ i;srcðrÞÞ

 !t
¼ uiðTiÞ  u
0
iðTiÞ  Ti
jFij 
!i;srcðrÞ
1 !
þ
X1
t¼0
u0iðTiÞ  Ti  !i;srcðrÞ
jFij  TsrcðrÞ  c
 
 yiðtþ i;srcðrÞÞ  !t ð22Þ
 uiðTiÞ  u
0
iðTiÞ  Ti
jFij 
!i;srcðrÞ
1 !
þ
X1
t¼0
u0iðTiÞ  Ti  !i;srcðrÞ
jFij  TsrcðrÞ  c
 
 !t ð23Þ
¼ uiðTiÞ  u
0
iðTiÞ  Ti
jFij 
!i;srcðrÞ
1 !
þ u
0
iðTiÞ  Ti  !i;srcðrÞ
jFij  TsrcðrÞ  c
 
 1
1 !
¼ uiðTiÞjFij 
!i;srcðrÞ
1 ! 
TsrcðrÞ  c
1 ! ; ð24Þ
where, in the transition from (22) to (23), we used Condition 2
and the fact that yiðtþ i;srcðrÞÞ  1. By using (21) and (24) in
(20), we get the following:
i 
X
r2Fi
uiðTiÞ
jFij 
1 !i;srcðrÞ
1 ! þ
uiðTiÞ
jFij 
!i;srcðrÞ
1 ! 
TsrcðrÞ  c
1 !
 
¼ 1
1 ! 
X
r2Fi
uiðTiÞ
jFij  TsrcðrÞ  c
 
¼ 1
1 !  uiðTiÞ  c 
X
r2Fi
TsrcðrÞ
 !
: ð25Þ
Now, let us consider what payoff is achieved by node i if
it fully cooperates in every time slot. In this case, since all
the other nodes play TFT, every node will always fully
cooperate, and hence, every node will experience a normal-
ized throughput equal to 1 in each time slot. This can easily
be derived from the i/o formulae describing the behavior of
the nodes, which take a simple form due to the simplicity of
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TABLE 2
Table of Symbols Used in the Paper
the strategy function of the TFT strategy. As a consequence,
we have that yiðtÞ ¼ 1 for every t, and xkðtÞ ¼ 1 for every k
and for every t. In this case, (14) becomes:
i ¼
X1
t¼0
uiðTi  yiðtÞÞ 
X
r2Fi
TsrcðrÞ  c 
Y
k2ðr;iÞ
xkðtÞ
2
4
3
5!t
¼ 1
1 !  uiðTiÞ  c 
X
r2Fi
TsrcðrÞ
 !
:
This means that by fully cooperating, the payoff of node i
reaches the upper bound expressed in (25); in other words,
there is no better strategy for node i than full cooperation.
APPENDIX B
GLOSSARY
See Table 2.
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